Job Market Paper

The merits of unilateral environmental trade policies: evidence from fisheries

Dennis Engist

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Unilateral environmental trade policies allow single actors to independently enact environmental protection standards beyond their borders. However, it is unclear under which conditions such policies achieve their goal, as they can be rendered ineffective by trade diversion. In this study, I examine this question at the example of the European Union policy against illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing, which is designed to enforce global fisheries standards through a system of warnings (yellow cards) and trade sanctions (red cards). I estimate the effect of yellow and red cards on trade and marine capture production. I find that both types of cards lead to reductions in exports to the EU, but no evidence of trade diversion. Meanwhile, I find a temporary reduction in catch following cards cards, which suggests that production rather than trade is adapted. I also identify a shift in fisheries production that is persistent after the cards are lifted. Specifically, I observe a reduction in the number of active fisheries, which points to the policy having lasting impacts beyond trade. This study provides evidence of a unilateral environmental trade policy that is effective in enforcing environmental standards and offers lessons for similar policies.